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Interest Rate Policy in China: The Impact of Suppressed Deposit Rates on
Household Income from 2000-2007
Abstract
An often-overlooked impact of China’s policy of maintaining low interest has been the suppression of
household interest income, which has increased the propensity of households to save while decreasing
their consumption rates. This paper posits that from 2000 to 2007, deposit rates in China were
suppressed annually by around 720 basis points, imposing an implicit tax on annual per-capita income of
12.8% on average. Raising deposit rates will increase household income and boost consumption in the
medium-term if the Chinese government is able to initiate policy shifts that distribute the gains of
economic growth more equitably to households. Research advised by Stephen Roach.
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1. Introduction
The economic development of China over the past three decades is
unprecedented in modern economic history. When Deng Xiaoping launched
his vision for a new China at the end of the 1970s, China’s economy was in
shambles. The Cultural Revolution had brought the nation to a standstill and
the economy remained entrenched in a centrally-planned socialist regime.
Since then, by dismantling the command-and-control economy that defined
the socialist state, the Chinese government has methodically instituted a
series of reforms that have transformed the nation from a Maoist self-reliant
state to today’s burgeoning export powerhouse. These reforms—and the
subsequent “opening up of China”—are central to the overarching goals of
the Chinese central government, which, as it perceives them, are to foster
growth and development while simultaneously maintaining social stability.
As part of an implicit social contract between the government and
households, the Chinese Communist Party-run government has directed
economic development through a series of five-year plans that promulgate
an image of pragmatism and across-the-board synchronization. Fiscal and
monetary policies are a critical part of these five-year plans. Unlike the
United States government, in which the Federal Reserve independently
determines monetary policy while the executive and legislative branches
determine fiscal policy, the Chinese government blurs the line between the
two; as both monetary and fiscal policies are controlled by the central
government and used in concert to pursue the state’s policy goals.
Unfettered by a public system of checks and balances, the Chinese power
structure wields significantly more authority in executing policy changes
than do the governments of most developed countries.
At its core, any enacted economic policy can be seen as a transfer of
wealth from one segment of the economy to another. Economic resources
are extracted from one sector through a tax and transferred to another sector
through a subsidy. In the aggregate, the decisions made by Chinese policymakers over time on such tradeoffs reveal that the government has followed
the Asian development model and pinned its growth objectives to the rapid
development of the nation’s export-driven industrial sector. By design, the
business sector of China’s economy, and specifically the state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), has been on the receiving end of much of these transfers.
While this has led to significant growth, even Wen Jiabao, China’s Premier,
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has characterized the outcome as being
uncoordinated, and ultimately unsustainable.”1

“unstable,

unbalanced,

What is often forgotten is that the transfer of wealth to fund a certain
subsidy for one sector has to originate from another sector. In China, that
source has, more often than not, been the households. The introductory
economics axiom that households benefit from strong economic growth
through the disbursement of dividends because firms are owned and/or
staffed by households breaks down when analyzing China. As a whole,
Chinese households have received a disproportionally small share of the
economic gains of the nation’s growth compared to the business and
government sectors while at the same time bearing a disproportionally large
share of the costs of subsidizing this growth. In other words, there has been a
continual net transfer of wealth from Chinese households to the business and
government sectors over the past few decades. The result has been the
persistent suppression of the personal income share of the Chinese economy
to around 60%, which is towards the lower end of the OECD countries.2
One of the main enablers of this wealth transfer from the households
has been the suppression of both lending and deposit rates in China.
Through a system of strict capital controls where the state directly manages
the banking sector and financial intermediation, the government has been
able to maintain a financial system that perpetuates financial repression,
which is defined as the suppression of interest rates below market clearing
levels. Such a policy reduces the cost of capital for borrowers in the economy,
namely enterprises and the government. However, households are forced to
pay an implicit tax by being undercompensated on their interest income from
their saving deposits.
The strategy of this paper is first to measure the implicit tax that
households are forced to pay because of the suppressed interest rate policies.
I will then explore the contribution of foregone household interest income to
the idiosyncratic behaviors of Chinese households, and specifically that of
their high savings rate and low consumption rate. Section 2 recapitulates the
relevant literature on interest rate liberalization and financial repression in
China. Section 3 lays out the policy and theoretical framework that has
guided Chinese decision-making in this area. Section 4 discusses the impact
of suppressed interest rates on other segments of the economy. Section 5
outlines the methodology for measuring the net costs borne by households
Roach, Stephen S. The Next Asia. Wiley, 2009. Chapter 3.
Aziz, Jahangir, et al. “Explaining China’s Low Consumption: The Neglected Role of
Household Income.” IMF Working Paper. WP/07/181. July 2007.
1
2
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and the impact of reduced interest income on per-capita incomes from 2000
to 2007. Section 6 summarizes and analyzes the results. Section 7 examines
the impact of the implicit tax on saving and consumption rates and how the
liberalization of interest rates may change household behavior. Section 8
discusses policy implications and challenges of reform. Section 9 concludes.

2. Literature Review
The topic of suppressed interest rates in the Chinese economy has
been widely noted in the academic literature. The liberalization of interest
rates is often pointed to as a necessary next step for the continued
modernization of China’s economy.
Bai, et al. (2001) characterized the system of financial repression in
China as a type of implicit flat tax levied on the non-state sector by the
government. They argue that a combination of suppressed interest rates,
strict capital controls, and state control of the banking system allows the
government to increase its net revenue by reducing interest expenses. The
authors posit that such a policy is effective in lieu of an income tax in
developing countries where tax policies are not well-developed.3
Feyzioglu, et al. (2009) explored the potential impact of interest rate
liberalization on financial intermediation and the cost of capital in China.
They find that liberalization will likely result in higher interest rates,
discourage marginal investment, improve the effectiveness of intermediation
and monetary transmission, and enhance the financial access of underserved
sectors.4
A handful of papers have attempted to quantitatively measure the
impact of suppressed interest rates on various segments of society. Ferri, et
al. (2010) found that the cost of capital for SOEs was unnaturally low even
though the SOEs were less profitable and had greater debt burdens
compared to other private Chinese enterprises. They calculated that if the
SOEs were forced to pay interest at market rates, their existing profits would
be wiped out.5
Bai, Chongen, et al. “Financial Repression and Optimal Taxation.” Economics Letters. V. 70.
Pg. 245-251, 2001.
4 Feyzioglu, et al. “Interest Rate Liberalization in China.” IMF Working Paper. WP/09/171.
Aug 2009.
5 Ferri, Geiovanni. “Honor Thy Creditors Beforan Thy Shareholders: Are the Profits of
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Real?” Asian Economic Papers 9:3. 2010.
3
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Using “back-of-the-envelope” calculations, Pettis (2010) estimated
that deposit rates had been repressed by at least 450 basis points for the last
decade. 6 For his calculation, Pettis relied on ratios based on the theoretical
steady state between nominal GDP growth and interest rates. He then
applied the difference in interest rates to total household deposits in 2010 to
calculate that households paid approximately 5% of GDP in the form of
unpaid interest payments to the banks.
In another analysis, Lardy (2008) calculated the implicit tax imposed
on households by the decline in real rates of return on savings deposits due
to rising inflation. He estimated how much higher household interest income
would have been in the first quarter of 2008 if households had received the
same real rate of interest on their net renminbi (RMB)-denominated saving
deposits as in 2002. He calculated the figure to equal 4.1% of 2008 GDP.7
Although the existing studies shed light on the cost of suppressed
deposit rates for households, they do not attempt to measure the net impact
on household incomes of such policies over time in an analytically rigorous
way. I focus on this issue in the following sections.
3. Theory and Policy
National economies are anchored by monetary policy, which defines
the terms of engagement between lenders and borrowers. More specifically,
the role of monetary policy is to intermediate the transfer of savings, or
foregone consumption, into investments by setting interest rates. Typically,
interest rates act as a pricing mechanism for the allocation of capital in
liberalized economies; it is a policy lever used as a stabilizing force for the
macro-economy. Governments in developed countries adjust interest rates
with the goal of promoting sustainable growth and/or price stability.
Prior to the Deng’s economic reforms beginning in 1979, interest
rates were arbitrarily determined by planning authorities, and thus played
no active role in regulating the supply and demand of funds.8 As the
economy slowly shifted towards a market-based system, the government
6 Pettis, Michael. “Who will pay for China’s bad loans?” China Financial Markets. 11 April
2010. http://mpettis.com/2010/04/who-will-pay-for-chinas-bad-loans/. Accessed 22
March 2011.
7 Lardy, Nicholas. “Financial Repression in China.” Peterson Institute for International
Economics. Policy Brief. September 2008.
8 Chen, Chien-Hsun. “Interest rates, savings and income in the Chinese economy.” Journal of
Economic Studies; 2002; 29, 1; ABI/INFORM Global. Pg. 59.
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began to move towards adjusting rates as a counter-cyclical policy tool. The
interest rate policy lever was bequeathed to the People’s Bank of China (PBC),
China’s newly designated central bank, when the National People’s Congress
passed its first central bank law on March 18, 1995. The new law established
a mandate for China’s monetary policy, which was to maintain currency
stability, and it gave the PBC the legal right to formulate and implement such
monetary policy.9 While on paper the PBC had the sole authority to control
and supervise the financial system, it was still directly subordinate to the
ruling State Council, and thus lacked independence.10
Due to the one-party system in China, the government is able to
marshal policies across every sector to pursue its fundamental goal of
promoting rapid economic growth and development. As such, the interest
rate has been commandeered to pursue the fiscal policy of continuously
boosting nationwide investment by keeping rates perpetually low—instead
of acting as a neutral guide for promoting the efficient allocation of capital.
Due in part to this subsidy, investment has accounted for a much larger share
of China’s recent GDP growth than in that of other countries.11

ibid
ibid
11 Prasad, Eswar. “Is the Chinese growth miracle built to last?” China Economic Review, 20
(2009) 103-123. 28 May 2008.
9

10
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The PBC controls interest rates in China by setting two benchmark
rates: the one-year lending rate and the one-year deposit rate. Both have
been suppressed far below what economic theory and sound macro
management practices would suggest. According to economic theory, there
is a long-term steady-state relationship between lending rates and the
nominal GDP growth rate.12 This equilibrium construct of interest rates
allows for the benefits of economic growth to be shared equitably between
lenders and borrowers. However, according to this theory, interest rates in
China have been far too low given China’s nominal growth rates, as seen in
Figure 1.13
Suppressed interest rates have been one of the most significant progrowth policies implemented by the government to nurture the development
of the state sector, which includes SOEs, state-controlled banks (SCBs), and
the government itself. Beginning in the late 1990s, low lending rates have
reduced the cost of capital for the businesses and government institutions,
which have stimulated the pursuit of high investment by businesses and local
governments to pursue high investment. Furthermore, the PBC has set the
benchmark deposit rate even lower, guaranteeing the SCBs a substantial
profit due to the sizeable spread between the amount they pay out as deposit
interest and the amount they receive as interest on the loans they underwrite.
A study by Avery (2009) found that China’s SCBs enjoyed a spread, averaging
343 basis points from 2000 to 2007, which was roughly twice the
international average.14 15 The Chinese government guarantees this large
interest rate spread for its SCBs because the government leans on these
banks for policy-driven lending.
While households have experienced the trickle-down benefits of
economic growth, they have also been forced to bear the cost of promoting
such growth. Households face a policy regime of financial repression where
low real rates of return on their savings deposits have suppressed interest
incomes while strict capital controls limit alternative investment options.
Because of the financial repression, households are forced to pay an
unavoidable implicit tax by being severely undercompensated on their
savings deposits.16 The burden of low interest rates borne by households has
been further increased due to the rise of inflation in recent years. When
Feyzioglu, et al. “Interest Rate Liberalization in China.”
Data from Bloomberg
14 Avery, Martha. China’s Emerging Financial Markets: Challenges and Global Impact. Wiley.
2009. P.Iii.
15 National Bureau of Statistics of China.
16 Bai. “Financial Repression and Optimal Taxation.”
12
13
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inflation reached double digits from 1993 to 1996, the Chinese government
implemented a policy of fiscal subsidy to ensure a non-negative real interest
rate on household deposits.17 However, such a policy has not been enacted
during recent bouts of inflation. Because the consumer price index (CPI) has
spiked higher than the suppressed nominal deposit rates on multiple
occasions over the past decade, households have at times suffered from a
negative real rate of return on their deposits as seen in Figure 2.18 In June
2007, the benchmark one-year deposit rate was raised to 3.33% while the
tax rate on bank interest income was cut from 20% to 5%.19 However, the
effective after-tax deposit rate of 3.16% was still below 4.75%, the CPI at the
time. Since inflation produces capital losses by reducing the real value of
existing financial asset holdings, households are actually losing money when
they deposit their earnings into savings accounts during times of high
inflation.20

Ma, Guonan, et al. “China’s high saving rate: myth and reality.” Bank of International
Settlements Working Papers. #312. 2010.
18 Lardy. “Financial Repression in China.”
19 Prasad. “Is the Chinese growth miracle built to last?”
20 Moore, B.J. “Inflation and Financial Deepening.” Journal of Developmental Economics 20
(1986) 125-133. North-Holland.
17
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In a system where the households are severely undercompensated on
their savings deposits, it would seem natural that they would be incentivized
to reallocate their capital to other investments with more favorable returns.
Such a situation occurred in the United States during the 1970s, when US
households responded to underperforming bank deposits due to a
combination of deposit rate ceilings imposed by Regulation Q and high
inflation by moving their assets to non-bank financial institutions. 21
However, banks do not face this problem in China. The average household
has limited options for alternative investments due to strict capital controls
placed on the economy by the government. Although the government points
to the dangers of liquidity flight as the reason for the strict capital controls, in
reality, the government depends on the massive pool of household savings
deposits, amounting to RMB 17.9 trillion ($2.55 trillion) in 2008, to fund its
high level of state-directed investments.22 The majority of households in
China have no choice but to leave their earnings in low-returning and
sometimes money-losing savings deposits.
The uneven distribution of the benefits of economic growth caused by
inequitable economic policies has restricted household income growth in
China. While per-capita personal incomes have increased significantly in
absolute terms, its growth rate has not been as fast as that of China’s
economy.23 Simultaneously, there has been a steady rise in the cost of living
for households. Since the end of the Mao-era policies, the government has
privatized social safety net programs, forcing households to allocate more
resources to education, medical care, and retirement savings. 24 The
combined narratives of stunted household income growth and rising safety
net burdens in a society facing the demographic shifts of rapid aging have
increased the propensity of households to save while putting downward
pressure on discretionary purchasing power and consumption.
The causal link between repressed interest rates and both high
savings rates and low consumption rates has stark ramifications for future
economic policy in China. The government has previously identified limits
on interest rates as a fundamental problem in the economy. It not only
suppresses household income, but also perpetuates the inefficient allocation
of capital throughout the Chinese economy. Over the past few years, the
Rolnick, Arthur J. “The Benefits of Bank Deposit Rate Ceilings: New Evidence on Bank
Rates and Risk in the 1920s.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Quarterly Review.
Summer 1987.
22 Lardy. “Financial Repression in China.”
23 Aziz, Jahangir. “Explaining China’s Low Consumption.”
24 Ma. “China’s high saving rate.”
21
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government has repeatedly declared that it will pursue the liberalization of
interest rates.25 The call to action was repeated again by Premier Wen Jiabao
in the 12th Five-Year Plan, “We will push forward the market-based reform of
interest rates.”26 Raising household interest income will be a positive step
towards the 12th Five-Year Plan’s central goal of boosting domestic
consumption.
However, the obstacles to liberalizing interest rates are sizable and
numerous. The large-scale industries and SCBs who currently depend on
suppressed interest rates have significant political pull in the current
government. These groups will be opposed to any policy shifts that reduce
the implicit subsidies businesses and banks have come to depend upon.
Regardless, in order to realize the change in focus from export-driven
economic growth to consumption-driven growth, the Chinese government
must shift its economic policies from a system that heavily favors enterprises
and the government over households to a system that distributes the benefits
and costs of economic growth more equitably.

4. Implications on Other Segments of the Economy
Suppressed interest rates have contributed to the inefficient
allocation of capital throughout the Chinese economy and are responsible for
a number of hidden costs beyond simply holding down the growth of
household income. Specifically, the low-interest rate regime has lessened the
flexibility of governmental responses to macroeconomic shocks, subsidized
over-investment, perpetuated inefficient operations at SCBs and SOEs, and
skewed capital-labor ratios. Liberalizing interest rates would initiate
positive reform in all of these sectors. However, because low interest rates
also play a critical role in the mechanism through which the government
manages the RMB, it is unlikely the liberalization of interest rates will occur
as long as the government continues its policy of currency management.
By using interest rates to drive economic growth rather than steer
monetary policy, the government has reduced the efficacy of the policy route
in controlling rising inflation. The government has been forced to rely
instead on other less effective monetary tools such as bank reserve ratios
“Interest-rate reforms to be continued: PBOC official.” China Daily. 8 Nov 2010.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90859/7191057.html. Accessed 12 Mar
2010.
26 Report on the Work of the Government, Delivered at the Fourth Session of the Eleventh
National People's Congress on March 5, 2011, Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council
25
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and lending quotas to perform the stabilizing role that interest rates play in
more developed economies. Policies such as lending quotas are blunter and
cause jarring—and potentially distorting—adjustments when utilized.
Furthermore, although such tools provide a similar signaling effect as the
interest rate does in other countries, the impact of loan quotas on the
Chinese economy is uneven and tends to lag behind the immediate response
a shift in the interest rate typically brings in a developed economy. This has
resulted in adjustments that have never been quick enough to fully reflect the
range of cyclical factors.27
In a developed economy, the central bank uses interest rates to guide
capital allocation so that the market can decide the most efficient level of
loan origination. Such has not been the case in China where the remnants of
the socialist planned economy remain. Although the practice of the central
bank imposing specific loan quotas on the four SCBs officially ended as of
December 31, 1997, the central government now predetermines the
availability of loans in the economy through annual loan quotas, which was
set at RMB 7.5 trillion for 2010.28 These quotas, however, have historically
often been ignored as a result of political pressure to pursue higher GDP
growth driven by investment.29
Over-investment has been often cited as a looming problem in the
Chinese economy. Throughout China, the desire to continue economic
expansion has a large impact on local government decisions on resource
allocation. Even though the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) announced a nationwide GDP growth target of 8% in early 2011,
only a fraction of the provincial governments have set targets below 10%.30
Local Chinese government officials are incentivized to maximize investment
projects since promotions are mainly determined by performance indicators
such as the economic growth in their jurisdictions.31 Combined with the fact
that projects with negative returns can seem profitable due to below-market
rates, the government has invested in many money-losing projects. This
incentive structure has resulted in a system where some estimates consider
that 20% of loans provided to local governments are now non-performing.32
Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy. The MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 2007.
Xin, et al. “China declares shift to ‘prudent’ monetary policy.” Reuters. 3 Dec 2010.
29 Xie, Andy. “Rebalancing Cannot Wait.” Caixin Online. 11 March 2011.
http://english.caing.com/2011-03-11/100235531_1.html. Accessed 18 March 2011.
30 Kan, Huo. “Local Governments Still Feel Investment Pulse.” Caixin Online. 10 Feb 2011.
http://english.caing.com/2011-02-10/100224379.html. Accessed 18 March 2011.
31 Ma.. “China’s high savings rate myth/reality.”
32 Dorn, James A. “Financial Repression.” 12 Aug 2010.
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12053. Accessed 18 March 2011.
27
28
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Given the elevated debt levels of the state sector, higher interest rates would
only increase the cost of paying off these loans.
As outlined earlier, the SCBs in China have been kept afloat by the
generous government-mandated interest rate spread. Furthermore, because
the state owns a majority stake in each of the large commercial banks, the
government implicitly guarantees the viability of the banks, allowing the
SCBs to make gigantic mistakes without going under when lending to local
governments and SOEs. As a result, the screening mechanisms for new loan
origination have been overly relaxed; decisions are made to fulfill policy
objectives rather than shape economic viability. This process has led to the
high percentage of inefficient investments previously mentioned. The SCBs
have balked at recent initiatives from the China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC) designed to tighten credit restrictions, as branch loan
officers are now under pressure to increase both market share and deposits,
while simultaneously following stricter lending rules.33 The privileged
position the SCBs hold in the Chinese economy has also stymied the
development of competing sources of finance such as that of the corporate
bond markets. By reducing their spread slightly, banks are able to
discourage firms from issuing debt in the corporate bond market and instead
borrow from the bank, thereby keeping the bond market illiquid and
unattractive for the private sector.
SOEs have no qualms with allowing banks to continue dominating
credit intermediation. The main benefactors in an economy with repressed
interest rates are the borrowers, and in China the main borrowers are the
SOEs which received 65% of the total bank loans—nearly three times their
25% share of the GDP.34 SOEs receive the bulk of the bank loans because of
good relations with the central government. Loan officers at the SCBs are
overly risk-averse and issuing loans to the government-backed SOEs is
always perceived to be a safe bet. A 2006 IMF study found that the SCBs did
not appear to take enterprise profitability into account when making lending
decisions.35 The politically influenced relationship between SOEs and the
SCBs has led to a trend where forbearance on debt has been the rule rather
than the exception.36 Furthermore, net interest payments (as a share of GDP)
by the non-financial corporate sector have dropped by 50% from 1992 to
Xiu, Wen, et al. “Two-Edged Tightening for Bank Credit Controls.” Caixin online. 3 Mar
2011. http://english.caing.com/2011-03-03/100231870.html. Accessed 15 Mar 2011.
34 Ferri. “Honor Thy Creditors.”
35 Podpiera, Richard. “Progress in China’s Banking Sector Reform: Has Bank Behavior
Changed?” IMF Working Paper. March 2006.
36 ibid
33
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2007 due to suppressed rates.37 Low borrowing costs also make it easier for
underperforming businesses to roll over their debt, as the low rates
effectively reduce the real value of debt payments. 38 The study mentioned
earlier by Ferri (2010) found that if the SOEs were forced to pay interest at
market rates, their existing profits would be wiped out. 39 Due to the
substantial implicit and explicit government subsidies, SOEs are still very
inefficient when judged by Western standards. With banks willing to lend at
subsidized rates, firms tend to borrow as much as possible in order to
finance imprudent capital-intensive projects as well as to create reserves for
periods of credit tightening.40 The SOEs’ poor financial controls and
corporate governance have been estimated to cost the economy 5% of GDP
annually.41
Although households continue to implicitly subsidize SOEs,
households have not been fairly compensated on their financial assets. In
many countries that have a large presence of SOEs, the payment of dividends
by SOEs acts as a distributing conduit of profits to households in the form of
either government transfers or government provision of private goods such
as healthcare and education.42 However until recently, Chinese SOEs were
not required to pay dividends to their equity holders even though they have
been making net profits of around 6.5 to 7 percent of GDP since 2003.43
Capital in the form of retained earnings that should have been distributed to
shareholders, namely the government and households, was instead
reinvested in the companies. While new laws now dictate that SOEs have to
contribute 10% of profits to the state social security fund, these dividend
payments are still much lower than international averages.44 Such a scenario
explains why investment income in China accounts for only 8% of
households’ disposable income, which is one of the lowest rates in the
world.45 This statistic highlights the poor performance of the financial sector
in distributing profits from firms to households in the form of dividends and
interest income. Although businesses have achieved sizeable, albeit
inefficient success, the economic benefits they have accrued have not been
fairly distributed to households.
37 Yang, et al. “Why are savings rates so high in China?” NBER Working Paper Series 16771.
February 2011.
38 Pettis. “Who Will Pay for China’s Bad Loans?”
39 Ferri. “Honor Thy Creditors.”
40 Rajan, Raghuram G. Fault Lines. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey. 2010.
41 Ferri. “Honor Thy Creditors.”
42 Aziz, Jahangir. “Explaining China’s Low Consumption.”
43 ibid
44 ibid
45 ibid
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One of the core goals of the 12th Five-Year plan is to increase
employment growth, especially in China’s tertiary service sector, which
generates 35% more jobs per unit of GDP than its secondary sector.46
However, financial repression has kept the price of capital cheap, and along
with subsidized energy and land prices, has skewed the capital-labor ratio.
This has shifted production towards capital-intensive methods while
repressing needed employment growth.47 Such a scenario is inimical to the
government’s goals of increasing employment growth and expediting a
transition of unemployed and underemployed rural workers to employment
in more labor-intensive and services.48 Not only are low interest rates
reducing household incomes, they are also reducing the number of jobs
available.
The market liberalization of interest rates in China would unleash a
series of adjustments that would spur necessary modernizations of the
financial system and industry practices. Liberalized interest rates would
increase the efficacy of interest rates as a monetary policy lever. In the longterm, interest rate liberalization would also increase the efficiency of capital
allocation throughout the Chinese economy by forcing banks to be more
prudent in their investment decisions, SOEs to increase their operating
efficiency and transparency, and the government to reduce excess
investment.49 While the short-term frictions caused by these adjustments
may be onerous, the costs of not taking action only increase with time.

Wang, Qing, Steven Zhang, and Ernest Ho, “The China Files: Chinese Economy through
2020,” Morgan Stanley Blue Paper, November 8, 2010.
47 Prasad. “Is the Chinese growth miracle built to last?”
48 ibid
49 Feyzioglu, et al. “Interest Rate Liberalization in China.”
46
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5. Methodology of the Model
This analysis aims to determine the magnitude of the aforementioned
transfer of wealth from Chinese households to other segments of the
economy from 2000-2007.50 The methodology can be separated into two
main parts: 1) deriving proxies for China’s deposit rate in a free market
environment and 2) calculating the magnitude of the implicit tax paid by
households due to the difference between actual and market-determined
deposit rates.
A Market-Determined Interest Rate
The retroactive derivation of what levels Chinese deposit rates should
have been set at under liberalized, or marketized, conditions is an inexact
science. A model-based approach is used to estimate such a proxy for the
deposit rate in three different ways. The aim of the first proxy is to
determine where deposit rates would have been set if the SCBs were not
granted such a large spread between lending rates and deposit rates. The
second proxy measures what deposit rates would have been if they had been
set to hold real returns on deposits (net inflation) constant at the 2002 level.
The third proxy aims to find what deposit rates should have been according
to the theoretical steady state relationship between lending rates and
nominal GDP growth.51
The first proxy is found by determining what the deposit rates would
have been if the mandated spread between the lending rate and deposit rate
was halved while the lending rate was held constant. First, I halved the
annual spread between the year-end one-year lending rate and deposit rate.
I then added this result back to that year’s actual deposit rate. The rationale
behind this proxy is based on findings that suggest that the spreads between
lending rates and deposit rates enjoyed by the SCBs in China are about twice
the international average.52
The second proxy is derived by finding the level at which the nominal
deposit rates would have been set if they were adjusted to keep the real
deposit rate constant at the 2002 level. I used the real rate of deposits in
2002 because the real rate in that year was the highest of the studied period
(2000-2007). The real deposit rate in 2002 was found by subtracting the
This date range was chosen because of data constraints and since it encompasses the time
period of relative global economic stability between the Asian Financial Crisis and the subprime mortgage crisis.
51 Feyzioglu, et al. “Interest Rate Liberalization in China.”
52 Avery. China’s Emerging Financial Markets.
50
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year-end CPI-based inflation rate of -0.77%, from the nominal deposit rate of
1.98%, resulting in a real deposit rate of 2.75 %. I then calculated the
nominal deposit rate needed to maintain the 2.75% real deposit rate given
the annual inflation figure for each year in the studied period.
To derive the final proxy, I established a series of correlations that
would translate China’s nominal GDP growth rate to a proxy for deposit rates.
For the baseline comparisons, I used data on Australia, Canada, the United
States and the European Union. These nations were chosen because they
have been generally recognized to have reached “developed nation status.”53
Using regressions of the economic data on these nations from 2000-2007, I
determined the correlation between nominal GDP growth and the prime
lending rate as well as that between the prime lending rate and the deposit
rate. When combined, these correlations extend the theoretical steady-state
relationship between the nominal GDP growth rate and lending rates to a
derivation of deposit rates. In other words, the correlation was able to
answer the question: given nominal GDP growth, what should be the prime
lending rate, and subsequently, the deposit rate? Nominal GDP growth is
related to deposit rates by the following equation:
Derived deposit rate
China’s annual nominal GDP growth could then be calculated and
entered into the above equation to arrive at a projected level at which
deposit rates would be set according to this stead-state equilibrium.
Since China sets interest rate benchmarks using the one-year lending
rate and the one-year deposit rate, I needed to find two rates used by
developed economies as proxies for the Chinese benchmark rates. For the
lending rate proxy, I used the prime rate set by the central banks of each
country or region used in the sample. The prime rate is a good proxy for the
one-year Chinese lending rate since it is the short-term interest rate charged
by banks for short-term loans to their most creditworthy customers.54 In the
United States, the prime rate averages about 300 basis points above the
federal funds rate, which is the short-term interest rate at which banks lend
balances to the US Federal Reserve. Consequently, the federal funds rate
(sometimes called the benchmark deposit rate) of a country was used as a
proxy for the short-term deposit rate. As seen in Figure 3, there is a close
I considered using the Asian Tigers as another comparison, but these have inconsistent
correlations between GDP growths, their prime rates, and their federal funds rates.
54 “Prime Rate.” Mortgage-X, Mortgage Information Service. http://mortgagex.com/general/indexes/prime_rate.asp. 2011. Accessed 2 April 2011.
53
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correlation between the US federal funds rate and the Certificate of Deposit
Index (CODI), which is the Federal Reserve’s reported monthly average yield
on 3-month Certificate of Deposit rates.55

“Mortgage (ARM) Indexes.” Mortgage-X, Mortgage Information Service. http://mortgagex.com/general/indexes/default.asp. 2011. Accessed 2 April 2011.
55
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Using data from Bloomberg, I first regressed the nominal GDP growth
of the sampled nations using the year-end national prime rates and again
using the prime rates of the federal funds/deposit rates.56 The regressions
are shown below in Figures 4 and 5.57

Data from Bloomberg,
“Data.” The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/. 2011. Accessed 25 Feb 2011.
57 See appendix for data inputs
56

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011

17

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 8 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8

The regressions resulted in the following correlations:
1)

2)

a. y = predicted lending prime rate, x = nominal GDP growth

a. y = predicted deposit rate, x = prime lending rate

Equations 1) and 2) were combined in Equation 3) to relate nominal GDP
growth to the deposit rate proxy.
3)

a. y = predicted deposit rate, x = nominal GDP growth

Finally, China’s annual nominal GDP growth rates from 2000-2007 were
entered into the above equation.
The actual one-year deposit rate and the three derived proxies are graphed
below in Figure 6:
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The Implicit Household Tax
The second part of the model applies the derived deposit rates to
historical data in order to estimate the magnitude of the implicit tax paid by
households due to the suppressed deposit rates.58 First, the annual net
household interest rate income was calculated from the flow of funds data by
subtracting household interest rate expense from household interest
income.59 The annual implicit tax was then derived by calculating the
difference between the actual annual interest income and the projected
interest income under each derived deposit rate.60 The formula is as follows
and the results of the model are shown in Figure 7:

58 Data on the aggregate annual household interest income in China was collected from the
National Bureau of Statistics of China.
59 It is assumed that a rise in deposit rates would be accompanied by a simultaneous and
equal rise in lending rates. Further, the model assumes that deposit and borrowing behavior
remained constant as interest rates shift.
60 The difference between rates paid on time deposits as compared to demand deposits was
ignored.
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The total implicit tax paid by households from 2000 to 2007 was
calculated by summing the annual implicit tax calculated using the above
formula. Results are shown below in Figure 8:
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The total implicit tax paid by households as a percentage of annual
nominal GDP was also found. The results found in Figure 7 were divided by
the annual nominal GDP to arrive at the annual transfer of wealth away from
households as a percentage of nominal GDP. The formula is as follows and
the results are graphed below in Figure 9:

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011

21

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 8 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8

The implicit tax was also calculated as a percentage of annual percapita income.61 The net annual per-capita costs were divided by the yearend populations and then divided by the per-capita household income to
arrive at this figure. The formula is as follows and the results are shown
below in Figure 10:

Annual per capita income was found by averaging the per capita urban and rural incomes
by their respective portion of the population.

61
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Projected Per-Capita Net Savings Deposits
The final part of the model calculates what the annual per-capita net
savings would have been under the derived deposit rates if the higher
deposit interest income was allowed to accrue and earn interest in
subsequent years.
A baseline model for annual year-end deposits was established using
data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The derived deposit
rates were than used to calculate the extra interest that would have accrued
to households over the baseline if the central bank-controlled savings rate
had instead been the derived rate.
The baseline case begins with the annual year-end net savings
deposits of Chinese households from 2000-2007 (1999 data is included as
the starting point for all models). This was found by subtracting total
household loans from total household deposits. The annual increase in net
deposits is then calculated by subtracting the previous year’s year-end net
deposits from the current year’s net deposits.62 The net interest income for
any given year is found by subtracting total household interest expense from
interest income and is assumed to have accrued only on the year-end
deposits from the previous year. The remainder of the annual increase is
attributed to new net deposits, which are assumed to begin earning interest
only at the beginning of the following calendar year. The net interest income
and net deposits are then divided by the year-end population to arrive at the
annual net interest income per-capita and the annual net deposits per-capita.
The projected per-capita net saving deposits are then calculated using
the derived deposit rates. In accordance with the assumption that the
interest income for any given year only accrues on the year-end net deposits
from the previous year, the “effective interest rate” is calculated by dividing
the actual net interest income for the given year by the year-end net deposits
of the previous year. In order to factor in the derived deposit rates, the
actual “effective interest rate” was increased in proportion to the ratio of the
derived deposit rate and the official one-year deposit rate.
The new derived effective interest rate is then multiplied by the
previous year’s year-end net deposits to arrive at the current year’s
projected net interest income. The projected net interest income and the
calculated annual new net deposits (calculated from the baseline model) are
Data on the annual national household interest income was obtained from the flow of
funds database available through the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS).
62
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added to the previous year’s year-end deposits to arrive at the current year’s
net deposits. This method uses the actual deposits figure for 1999 as the
starting point and derives projected net interest incomes and year-end net
deposits annually from 2000-2007. The projected net interest income and
projected net year-end deposits are divided by the annual populations to
arrive at the per-capita figures. The methodology was repeated for each of
the three proxies.
The 2007 difference between the projected net deposits under the
GDP growth proxy and the baseline was found to be RMB 8,617. The results
are shown in Figure 11:
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6. Summary of Results and Analysis
Summary Statistics
2000-2007 Average Deposit Rate
2000-2007 Average Margin over
Baseline

1/2 Margin Constant 2002 Real
Baseline Deposit

2.45%

2007 Implicit Tax (Bn RMB)
2007 Implicit Tax as % of 2007 GDP
2000-2007 Average Implicit Tax (Bn
RMB)
2000-2007 Average Implicit Tax as %
GDP
2000-2007 Total Implicit Tax (Bn
RMB)
2000-2007 Total Implicit Tax (2007
Bn RMB)
2000-2007 Total Implicit Tax as % of
2007 GDP
2000-2007 Total Implicit Tax PerCapita (RMB)
2000-2007 Average Implicit Tax PerCapita (RMB)
2000-2007 Average Implicit Tax PerCapita as % of Income
2007 Net Savings Balance Per-Capita
(RMB)
2007 Margin of Net Savings Balance
Per-Capita over Baseline (RMB)

4.41%

9.69%

1.72%
179
0.67%

1.95%
361
1.36%

7.23%
1,246
4.69%

230

239

941

1.60%

1.44%

5.86%

1,842

1,912

7,526

1,626

1,733

6,802

6.12%

6.52% 25.59%

1,427

1,473

5,804

178

184

725

1.60%
10,664

GDP Proj

4.17%

3.16% 12.83%

12,379

12,367

19,281

1,716

1,704

8,617

The total implicit taxes paid by households in 2007 were as follows:
1/2 Margin- RMB 179.2 bn ($24.5 bn), Constant 2002 Real Rate- RMB 361.1
bn ($49.4 bn), GDP – RMB 1,246.4 bn ($170.6 bn).
As a point of context, the amount the government collected in
household income tax was RMB 319 billion, or 1.3% of GDP in 2007.63 The
implicit tax paid by households in 2007 due to interest rate suppression
under the GDP projected proxy (RMB 1,246 bn, 4.7% of GDP) was about four
times the amount households paid in explicit income taxes in 2007.
Interestingly, this means that Chinese households were paying much more in
implicit taxes than they were in explicit taxes.
Assuming that all additional interest that should have accrued was left
in the savings deposits, according to the GDP proxy, households had their
63

Lardy. “Financial Repression in China.”
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potential wealth reduced by a total of RMB 8,617 from 2000 to 2007. This
amounts to more than the average income in 2007, which was RMB 8,475.
Moreover, these percentages may mask the greater impact of unpaid
interest income to rural Chinese households as compared to the impact on
urban households. There is a significant difference between urban and rural
incomes, and subsequently, per-capita interest incomes. According to OECD
research, average per-capita incomes in urban areas were 3.3 times greater
than those in rural areas in 2009.64
Lastly, the PBC lifted the deposit rate from 2.52% in 2006 to 4.14% in
2007, which explains the downward shift in the implicit income tax as a
percentage of both GDP and annual income in 2007.

7. Impact of Suppressed Deposit Rates on Household Behavior
The large implicit taxes paid by households has contributed to the
suppression of household income growth, which in turn has played a
significant role in promoting the propensity of Chinese households to save.
Chinese household savings have risen from 16% of GDP in 2000 to 23% of
GDP in 2008.65 The rise in household savings is the result of two competing
influences. From 1992 to 2008 there has been a 10 percentage point decline
in the household income share of GDP and a 10 percentage point increase in
the average propensity to save from household disposable income. 66
Together, these two trends have led to the marked decline in household
consumption from 55% of GDP two decades ago to 33% in 2009.67 The root
of the high savings propensity has been hotly debated in the literature with
suggested causes including income uncertainties engendered by the
transition to the market economy, limited availability of instruments to
borrow against future incomes to finance purchase, lack of international
portfolio diversification, a severely lacking and under-funded social safety
net, and an aging society. Of these, recent literature has pointed to future
income uncertainty due to suppressed incomes and the lack of a viable social
safety net as the two core causes for high precautionary saving.

Roach, Stephen. “China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: Strategy vs. Tactics.” Morgan Stanley Asia. 21
March 2011.
65 Ma. “China’s high savings rate.”
66 ibid
67 Xie, Andy. “Rebalancing Cannot Wait.”
64
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The drop in the household share of gross national disposable income
over the past 15 years can be attributed to the fall in the labor share in
national income, a decline in investment income due to low returns on
financial assets, and diminished net income transfers due to the lack of a
social safety net. The decline in wages as a share of GDP has had the most
impact on the drop in the household share of gross national disposable
income as wages constitute 80% of disposable income in China.68 The
decline in labor share caused by a compressed demographic transition, a
prolonged process of absorbing surplus rural labor, and a lagging laborintensive service sector accounted for about 60% of the observed decline in
the household income share of GDP between 1992 and 2007.69 Furthermore,
as a share of GDP, net household interest income decreased by 50% in the
past 15 years, which accounts for a further quarter of the decline in the
household income share of GDP.70 The major cause for the decline in
investment income has been the implicit tax households have been forced to
pay. The implicit tax rate was calculated to have averaged 13% of annual
per-capita income from 2000 to 2007.
Furthermore, income redistributions from the government through
taxes, contributions, and transfers have so far been ineffective in stabilizing
the household share of income, contributing to uncertainty regarding the
viability of the social safety net. In 2005, government transfers to
households stood at only around ½ percent of GDP, a rate well below the
average of transfers from government to households in advanced and other
emerging economies.71 A contributing factor to this low rate was the 1997
pension reform that cut government liabilities while introducing individual
pension accounts funded by mandatory employee contributions. Prior to the
pension reform of 1997, urban workers received pensions through their
employers with a replacement ratio of about 75% to 80% relative to average
wage.72 Although social welfare contributions by the household sector
tripled from 1.4% of GDP in 1997 to 4.2% in 2007, workers retiring after
1997 receive a net pension that has been calculated to have a replacement
ratio of only about 60% of average wage.73 Furthermore, multiple scandals
associated with local pension funds have added to fears regarding the

Ma. “China’s high savings rate.”
ibid
70 Ma. “China’s high savings rate.”
71 Aziz, Jahangir. “Explaining China’s Low Consumption.”
72 Prasad, Eswar. “Income Uncertainty and Household Savings in China.” IZA Discussion
Paper No. 5331. November 2010.
73 Ma. “China’s high savings rate.”
68
69
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viability of the current pension programs.74 In addition, the privatization of
the medical and education systems has led to the Chinese government
spending only around 3 percent of GDP on health and education, a rate that is
one of the lowest in the world.75 The low government spending in these
areas adds additional financial burdens to Chinese households.
A recent study by Prasad (2010) found that over half of the increase in
China’s urban savings rate can be traced to the two main causes mentioned
above: the rising income uncertainty of future income and pension reforms
resulting in a reduced social safety net.76 Young households have responded
to increased future income uncertainty by saving more in order to adjust
their buffer stock of savings to the riskier environment, while older
households have saved more due to weakened confidence in the
sustainability of the state pension program.77 Specifically, the rise in
inflation in recent years has augmented the negative impact of financial
repression on household interest income. The government’s track record of
failing to raise interest rates to ward off inflation has played a large role in
stirring the future income uncertainty of households.
The following question then arises: would raising the interest rate
reduce the propensity to save, thereby boosting consumption by Chinese
households? I propose that the impact of higher interest rates would differ
between the wealthier urban households and the poorer rural households.
In a developed nation, such as the United States, households hold a
majority of their savings in the form of stocks, bonds, and real estate rather
than in savings deposits. Typically, the values of financial assets and real
assets are inversely correlated with interest rates; when rates fall, the value
of these assets rises and vice versa. The opposite is true for savings deposits;
when rates fall, the value of savings deposits fall too, since less interest
income is earned and vice versa. However, because a majority of savings is
allocated to financial assets and real assets rather than savings deposits, if
interest rates decline, prices of financial assets will rise, thereby increasing
the wealth of asset holders. Thus, ceteris paribus, people consume more
when interest rates are at lower levels meaning that the substitution effect is
stronger than the income effect. This effect is substantiated by the fact that

ibid
Aziz, Jahangir. “Explaining China’s Low Consumption.”
76 Prasad, “Income Uncertainty.”
77 ibid
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US consumption as a share of GDP tends to be correlated with the
performance of the asset markets, reflecting the wealth effect.78
Wealthier households in China would respond similarly to typical
households in the West, as they are able to diversify their savings away from
bank deposits into real assets and thus are able to avoid the implicit tax on
savings deposits. Driven by negative returns on bank deposits, wealthier
households have been incentivized to allocate their capital into more risky
financial products such as stocks and real estate even as asset bubbles loom
ominously in these markets. Such a trend is reflected in the high proportion
of household wealth held in these assets in China. In 2007, bank deposits
accounted for 27% of average household wealth across China, property
accounted for 53%, and stocks accounted for 13%.79 However, if interest
rates were raised, the tradeoff on yields between savings deposits and
higher-risk investments would not be as drastic, thereby reducing the
incentive for households to allocate as much wealth into financial and real
assets. In doing so, higher interest rates should cool down the threat of asset
bubbles bursting in the red-hot real estate and stock markets. In total, it
seems that higher interest rates would promote safer investment decisions
among those households in China who have enough capital to diversify. The
number of such households, however, is quite low as the total number of
individual investor accounts on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges
is only about 5 percent of the population.80
In China and certain other countries following the Asian development
model, rising interest rates are more often associated with higher, not lower,
consumption.81 Since a majority of rural household savings are in bank
deposits, changing deposit rates would have a large impact on the wealth of
these households. To explain this phenomenon, Pettis (2010) references
Modigliani’s life-cycle theory and proposes that Chinese households have
targeted savings goals such as paying for their child’s education or reaching a
certain figure to provide for retirement. Because a majority of households
depend on saving deposits as their main investment vehicle, a higher deposit
rate would allow them to reach their goals faster, which in turn would
Pettis, Michael. “Chinese savings and the wealth effect.” China Financial markets. 20 April
2010. http://mpettis.com/2010/04/chinese-savings-and-the-wealth-effect/. Accessed 21
March 2011.
78
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Research Note, 19 October 2007.
80 Aziz.“Explaining China’s Low Consumption.”
81 ibid
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decrease the portion of their incomes dedicated to savings and increase the
portion designated for consumption.82 83 This theory assumes that the
income effect resulting from higher interest rates would outweigh the
substitution effect for the average Chinese household.
However, the impact of raising deposit rates on saving and
consumption behavior is not clearly defined. As described earlier, the
average household in China faces an uncertain outlook for their future
incomes. In addition, fully-loaded costs of living continue to rise as the
government privatization programs have transferred the burden of paying
for social security, private pensions, and medical insurance from the state to
individual households. Although the government has publicly declared its
intentions to boost the social safety net, the means to do so remain unclear.
Because of the continued wealth transfers away from households,
households face a declining margin between their expected future incomes
and their expected future living expenses, leading to greater precautionary
saving.
Thus, if presented only with higher deposit rates without
concomitant improvements in the outlook of their future incomes and the
social safety net, poorer households may consume even less and save even
more of their higher current income in the short-term. In order to bring
down the savings rate and drive household consumption, the Chinese
government needs to alleviate household uncertainties by instituting a
fundamental shift in the orientation of its economic policy.

8. Policy Implications and Challenges to Reform
At present, the structure of China’s economy can be characterized as a
government that mines resources from the non-state sector and then uses
the resources to subsidize a state sector composed of state-owned
enterprises, state-controlled commercial banks, and the government itself.
Although the economy has embraced market liberalizations when convenient,
at its core, the economy still implicitly maintains the pro-industry mentality
of a socialist regime. Many of the fundamental imbalances in the Chinese
economy can be traced to this legacy.
Guonan (2010) found that while the government’s disposable income
has risen from 15% of GDP in 1997 to 24% of GDP in 2008 due to higher
Pettis, Michael. “Who will pay for China’s bad loans?”
Modigliani, Franco. “The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving and Intercountry Differences in
the Saving Ratio,” in Induction, Growth and Trade, eds. W. A. Eltis, M. FG. Scott, and J. N. Wolfe.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977-225. 1970.
82
83
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economic growth, the government’s savings rate has also increased.84 While
government consumption over time has remained stable at 15% of GDP, total
government expenditure, which includes government investment spending,
has grown from 11% of GDP in the 1990s to 20% in the 2000s.85 In other
words, the government’s revenues have been increasingly invested in driving
high GDP growth instead of being spent to fund pensions and other aspects of
the social safety net.
Furthermore, the government’s explicit support of the export industry
is revealed in the balance of the government’s spending on tax rebates for
exports (TREs). The volume of TREs has grown from RMB 115 bn in 2002 to
RMB 586.6 bn in 2008.86 In 2006, the total TREs received by exporting firms
amounted to 14% of government tax revenue.87 On the other hand, the
government collected RMB 1195.5 bn of income taxes and RMB 1081.2 bn of
social insurance fees in 2007 while only spending RMB 1028 bn on social
welfare payments, social insurance provisions, and other transfers.88 This
means that the government actually had a net gain of RMB 1248.9 bn in net
transfers from households in 2007.89 From these figures, it is clear that
government budgeting clearly favors exporters over households.
To date, the government has relied on fiscal measures to transfer this
accumulation of wealth from the state sector back to households. Such
measures include increasing meager social security payments, subsidizing
low-rent housing, and instituting direct payments to poorer citizens. At the
very least, the government must continue such payments while also
continuing to strengthen the social safety net as the current public welfare
system remains fragmented and underfunded. The recent move to transfer a
percentage of listed state company shares to shore up pension assets is a
step in the right direction.90 The government should aim to create a more
integrated and broader-based social safety net with enhanced funding from
the central government that focuses on the low-income segments of the
population.91 However, these policies are only after-the-fact attempts to fix a
structural problem. These transfers are easier for the government to
implement than fundamental shifts in monetary policy, but are unsustainable
as the associated costs of the transfers will only continue to rise over time.
Ma. “China’s high saving rate.”
ibid
86 Yang, et al. “Why are savings rates so high in China?”
87 ibid
88 ibid
89Yang, et al. “Why are savings rates so high in China?”
90 Ma. “China’s high savings rate.”
91 ibid
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Rather than relying solely on fiscal transfers to subsidize consumption,
the government needs to shift its focus towards boosting personal incomes
as well. Such a transition requires rebalancing the systemic transfers of
wealth that are now heavily skewed against households. Equitable
macroeconomic policies, such as liberalized interest rates and a welldeveloped and efficient financial sector that adequately distributes gains
from economic growth to households are essential ingredients for balanced
and sustainable growth. The only way the government can earn back
household confidence is by following through on promises to boost incomes.
Otherwise, households will continue to engaging in high levels of
precautionary saving due to the perception of a shrinking spread between
their future incomes and future costs of living.
However, there are tremendous challenges to implementing the
structural reforms required to rebalance the Chinese economy while
maintaining robust internal demand. Increasing income for households will
necessitate decreasing resources accrued to the government and enterprises.
In addition, those sectors of the economy that have benefitted most from
these policies, namely the government, SOEs and SCBs, will strongly oppose
any reforms that remove the subsidies they have been receiving.
Furthermore, China is in the midst of a leadership transition, as the current
central leadership will be replaced in 2012. Many top executives of SOEs and
provincial leaders are members of the powerful Central Committee of the
Communist Party and senior leaders in Beijing need their support in gaining
coveted seats on the Politburo for themselves or their protégés, which only
increases the pressures to maintain the status quo.92
The two most-often stated goals of monetary policy in China are to
avoid instability by improving standards of living and to develop a virtuous
cycle of economic improvements.93 Moving towards these targets requires a
well-functioning financial system that promotes continued growth and
development. However, the overarching prerogative of the Chinese
government is social stability and opponents of further liberalization will
most likely frame such changes as destabilizing. Further declines in external
demand could slow China’s growth rate even more, possibly to a level that
the central leadership regards as inadequate for sustaining job growth and
social stability. If this happens, the government will resort once again to
stimulative policies centered on pumping liquidity into the economy. In
relative terms, fostering a high rate of growth is the easiest cure for deep
Pei, Minxin. “China’s Bumpy Ride Ahead.” The Diplomat. http://the-diplomat.com/whatsnext-china/chinas-bumpy-ride-ahead. 16 February 2011. Accessed 1 March 2011.
93 Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy.
92
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structural problems as it diminishes the scale of past mistakes while also
creating the resources to deal with the problems.94 The PBC has also
historically reduced interest rates when the RMB has appreciated in order to
mollify sectors hurt the most, and specifically exporters with their strong
governmental lobby. With heavy global pressure on the RMB to continue
appreciating, the PBC may be compelled to repeat its past actions, which
would only exacerbate the aforementioned imbalances.

9. Conclusion
For the past three decades of reform, the Chinese government has
looked to enterprises as the driving force behind the nation’s continued
economic growth and development. While the quality of living for Chinese
households has elevated dramatically across the board, economic gains
accrue to households only after the state and state-backed institutions have
taken more than their fair share.
The unveiling of the Chinese government’s 12th Five-Year Plan finally
places the economic focus on the household. The central goal of the policy is
to shift the Chinese economy away from relying on export- and investmentled growth and instead towards domestic consumption. To realize this shift,
the government plans to focus on increasing jobs in the service sector,
boosting rural incomes, and improving the social safety net.95
The success of 12th Five-Year Plan depends primarily on whether the
government is able to fundamentally shift the structure of its economy from
that of one fixated on funneling resources into high investment for the sake
of driving GDP growth to one that distributes economic resources more
equitably and sustainably. The liberalization of interest rates would
demonstrate a commitment to the latter orientation. The suppression of
interest rates has been a cornerstone policy for fostering the growth of the
state and state-backed sectors to the detriment of households. As this paper
has calculated, suppressed deposit rates have imposed an implicit tax of
about 13% annually on households to subsidize a lower cost of capital for
businesses and the government. From 2000 to 2007, the average household
was undercompensated by an amount roughly equivalent to an entire year’s
salary in 2007.

94
95

Prasad, “Income Uncertainty.”
Roach. “China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: Strategy vs. Tactics.”
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However, merely raising interest rates will not be enough. Without
the aforementioned economic policy shift, Chinese households will continue
to be apprehensive about their economic futures, leading to sustained high
savings and low consumption. Instead, a market-based interest rate must be
coupled with a broadened financial system that creates alternative
investment opportunities for households and a more responsible business
sector that distributes a greater share of profits to households as dividends.
Furthermore, the government must make a renewed and earnest effort to
create a viable and well-funded social safety net. Only by achieving
significant progress on all these fronts can the government instill confidence
and permanently boost household consumptions levels.
If the Chinese government does not fundamentally reorient its
economic policies, any efforts to achieve the goals outlined in the 12th FiveYear Plan will be in vain. The government would instead be forced to
continue to rely on short-sighted fiscal transfers to assuage an increasingly
volatile population. If the government chooses this unsustainable route, it
will only be delaying an inevitable policy transformation that becomes more
costly by the day.
It will not be costless to implement the proposed policies. But the
fundamental shifts they bring are integral for China’s sustainable
development. The tradeoff comes down to whether the government values
short-term stability or long-term viability. Although it is unlikely that the
government will wander far from its monetary policy orthodoxy, it would
serve them well to step back and allow Adam Smith’s invisible hand do its
work.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol8/iss1/8

34

Zhang: Impact of Suppressed Deposit Rates on Chinese Households

10. Works Cited
Avery, Martha. China’s Emerging Financial Markets: Challenges and Global
Impact. Wiley. 2009. P.Iii.
Aziz, Jahangir, et al. “Explaining China’s Low Consumption: The Neglected
Role of Household Income.” IMF Working Paper. WP/07/181. July
2007.
Bai, Chongen, et al. “Financial Repression and Optimal Taxation.” Economics
Letters. V. 70. Pg. 245-251, 2001.
Bloomberg. Yale Law School Terminal. Accessed 18 January 2011.
Chen, Chien-Hsun. “Interest rates, savings and income in the Chinese
economy.” Journal of Economic Studies; 2002; 29, 1; ABI/INFORM
Global. Pg. 59.
“Data.” The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/. 2011. Accessed 25 Feb
2011.
Dorn,
James
A.
“Financial
Repression.”
12
Aug
2010.
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12053. Accessed 18
March 2011.
Ferri, Geiovanni. “Honor They Creditors Beforan Thy Shareholders: Are the
Profits of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Real?” Asian Economic
Papers 9:3. 2010.
Feyzioglu, et al. “Interest Rate Liberalization in China.” IMF Working Paper.
WP/09/171. Aug 2009.
“Interest-rate reforms to be continued: PBOC official.” China Daily. 8 Nov
2010.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90859/7191057.ht
ml. Accessed 12 Mar 2010.
Ma, Guonan, et al. “China’s high saving rate: myth and reality.” Bank of
International Settlements Working Papers. #312. 2010.
“Mortgage (ARM) Indexes.” Mortgage-X, Mortgage Information Service.
http://mortgage-x.com/general/indexes/default.asp. 2011. Accessed
2 April 2011.
Lardy, Nicholas. “Financial Repression in China.” Peterson Institute for
International Economics. Policy Brief. September 2008.
Modigliani, Franco. “The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving and Intercountry
Differences in the Saving Ratio,” in Induction, Growth and Trade, eds.
W. A. Eltis, M. FG. Scott, and J. N. Wolfe. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977-225. 1970.
Moore, B.J. “Inflation and Financial Deepening.” Journal of Developmental
Economics 20 (1986) 125-133. North-Holland.
National Bureau of Statistics of China. http://www.stats.gov.cn/english. 12
January 2011.
Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy. The MIT Press. Cambridge,
Massachusetts. 2007.

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011

35

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 8 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8

Pei, Minxin. “China’s Bumpy Ride Ahead.” The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/whats-next-china/chinas-bumpy-ride-ahead.
16
February 2011. Accessed 1 March 2011.
Pettis, Michael. “Chinese savings and the wealth effect.” China Financial
markets. 20 April 2010. http://mpettis.com/2010/04/chinesesavings-and-the-wealth-effect/. Accessed 21 March 2011.
Pettis, Michael. “Who will pay for China’s bad loans?” China Financial Markets.
11 April 2010. http://mpettis.com/2010/04/who-will-pay-forchinas-bad-loans/. Accessed 22 March 2011.
Podpiera, Richard. “Progress in China’s Banking Sector Reform: Has Bank
Behavior Changed?” IMF Working Paper. March 2006.
“Prime Rate.” Mortgage-X, Mortgage Information Service. http://mortgagex.com/general/indexes/prime_rate.asp. 2011. Accessed 2 April 2011.
Prasad, Eswar. “Income Uncertainty and Household Savings in China.” IZA
Discussion Paper No. 5331. November 2010.
Prasad, Eswar. “Is the Chinese growth miracle built to last?” China Economic
Review, 20 (2009) 103-123. 28 May 2008.
Rajan, Raghuram G. Fault Lines. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New
Jersey. 2010.
Report on the Work of the Government, Delivered at the Fourth Session of
the Eleventh National People's Congress on March 5, 2011, Wen
Jiabao, Premier of the State Council
Roach, Stephen. “China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: Strategy vs. Tactics.” Morgan
Stanley Asia. 21 March 2011.
Roach, Stephen S. The Next Asia. Wiley, 2009. Chapter 3.
Rolnick, Arthur J. “The Benefits of Bank Deposit Rate Ceilings: New Evidence
on Bank Rates and Risk in the 1920s.” Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis. Quarterly Review. Summer 1987.
Wang, Qing, Steven Zhang, and Ernest Ho, “The China Files: Chinese Economy
through 2020,” Morgan Stanley Blue Paper, November 8, 2010.
Wang, Qing. “Impact of Stock Bubble Burst: An Update” Morgan Stanley China
Economics Research Note, 19 October 2007.
Xie, Andy. “Rebalancing Cannot Wait.” Caixin Online. 11 March 2011.
http://english.caing.com/2011-03-11/100235531_1.html. Accessed
18 March 2011.
Xin, et al. “China declares shift to ‘prudent’ monetary policy.” Reuters. 3 Dec
2010.
Xiu, Wen, et al. “Two-Edged Tightening for Bank Credit Controls.” Caixin
online.
3
Mar
2011.
http://english.caing.com/2011-0303/100231870.html. Accessed 15 Mar 2011.
Yang, et al. “Why are savings rates so high in China?” NBER Working Paper
Series 16771. February 2011.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol8/iss1/8

36

Zhang: Impact of Suppressed Deposit Rates on Chinese Households

11. Appendix
Appendix 1: China Population96
Total
Year

Population
(year-end)

By Residence
Urban
Population

Rural

Proportion

Population

Proportion

2000

126743

45906

36.22

80837

63.78

2001

127627

48064

37.66

79563

62.34

2002

128453

50212

39.09

78241

60.91

2003

129227

52376

40.53

76851

59.47

2004

129988

54283

41.76

75705

58.24

2005

130756

56212

42.99

74544

57.01

2006

131448

57706

43.90

73742

56.10

2007

132129

59379

44.94

72750

55.06

http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm

Appendix 2: China Flow of Funds97
2-32 Flow of Funds- Physical Transactions
Households
Income from Properties: Interest Payments
Net Interest Payments
Year
Utilization
Source
1992
6
1187
1181
1993
12
1789
1777
1994
20
2748
2727
1995
17
2938
2921
1996
24
3626
3601
1997
25
3281
3256
1998
31
3528
3497
1999
28
2912
2883
2000
40
2979
2939
2001
81
3102
3021
2002
367
3392
3025
2003
537
3525
2988
2004
1673
3770
2097
2005
1145
4053
2909
2006
1967
6305
4338
2007
2826
7281
4455
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1996e/Q17-10e.htm

96
97
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Appendix 3: Saving Deposits of Urban and Rural Households98
9-3 Savings Deposit of Urban and Rural Household
(100 million yuan)

Year

Year-onyear
Increase
Total

Balance at
Year-end
Total

Time
Deposits

Demand
Deposits

% Demand

Time
Deposits

Year
Baseline
1978
210.6
128.9
81.7
38.8%
29.0
17.2
1980
395.8
304.9
90.9
23.0%
114.8
138.5
1985
1,622.6
1,225.2
397.4
24.5%
407.9
324.3
1990
7,119.6
5,909.4
1,210.2
17.0%
1,935.1
1,700.9
1991
9,244.9
7634.9
1,610.0
17.4%
2,125.3
1,725.5
1992
11,757.3
9,445.0
2,312.3
19.7%
2,512.4
1,801.1
1993
15,203.5
12,108.3
3,095.2
20.4%
3,446.2
2,663.3
1994
21,518.8
16,838.7
4,680.1
21.7%
6,315.3
4,730.4
1995
29,662.3
23,778.3
5,884.1
19.8%
8,143.5
6,939.6
1996
38,520.8
30,873.2
7,647.6
19.9%
8,858.5
7,095.0
1997
46,279.8
36,226.7
10,053.1
21.7%
7,759.0
5,353.3
1998
53,407.5
41,791.6
11,615.9
21.7%
7,127.7
5,564.8
1999
59,621.8
44,955.1
14,666.7
24.6%
6,214.3
3,163.5
2000
64,332.4
46,141.7
18,190.7
28.3%
4,710.6
1,186.6
2001
73,762.4
51,434.9
22,327.5
30.3%
9,430.0
5,293.2
2002
86,910.7
58,788.9
28,121.8
32.4%
13,148.3
7,354.1
2003
103,617.7
68,498.7
35,119.0
33.9%
16,707.0
9,709.7
2004
119,555.4
78,138.9
41,416.5
34.6%
15,937.8
9,640.2
2005
141,051.0
92,263.5
48,787.5
34.6%
21,495.6
14,124.7
2006
161,587.3
103,011.4
58,575.9
36.3%
20,536.3
10,777.3
2007
172,534.2
104,934.5
67,599.7
39.2%
10,946.9
1,923.1
2008
217,885.4
139,300.2
78,585.2
36.1%
45,351.2
34,369.4
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1996e/Q17-10e.htm

98

Demand
Deposits
11.8
-23.7
83.6
234.2
399.8
711.3
782.9
1,584.9
1,204.0
1,763.6
2,405.7
1,562.8
3,050.8
3,524.0
4,136.9
5,794.1
6,997.3
6,297.6
7,370.9
9,766.7
9,023.8
10,983.6

BNS
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Appendix 4: Baseline Prime Rates, Federal Funds Rates, and Nominal GDP
Growth99
Column1 US CODI US Prime US Fed US GDP Aus PrimeAus Fed Aus GDP Can PrimeCan Deposit
Can GDP ECB Lending
EU GDP China 1-YrChina
ECB Deposit
Lending
Deposit
China GDP
2000
6.46%
9.50%
6.24%
6.43%
9.27%
5.90%
6.61%
7.27%
3.48%
9.58%
5.75%
3.75%
6.10%
5.85%
2.25% 10.64%
2001
3.69%
4.75%
3.89%
3.39%
8.66%
5.06%
6.78%
5.81%
2.25%
2.92%
4.25%
2.25%
4.30%
5.85%
2.25% 10.52%
2002
1.73%
4.25%
1.67%
3.48%
8.16%
4.55%
7.10%
4.21%
0.83%
4.05%
3.75%
1.75%
3.20%
5.31%
1.98%
9.74%
2003
1.15%
4.00%
1.13%
4.71%
8.41%
4.81%
5.95%
4.69%
1.10%
5.23%
3.00%
1.00%
2.90%
5.31%
1.98% 12.87%
2004
1.45%
5.25%
1.35%
6.52%
8.85%
5.25%
7.53%
4.00%
0.78%
6.41%
3.00%
1.00%
4.40%
5.58%
2.25% 17.71%
2005
3.51%
7.25%
3.21%
6.50%
9.06%
5.46%
7.04%
4.42%
0.79%
6.42%
3.25%
1.25%
3.90%
5.58%
2.25% 15.67%
2006
5.15%
8.25%
4.96%
6.01%
9.41%
5.81%
8.09%
5.81%
1.83%
5.57%
4.50%
2.50%
5.30%
6.12%
2.52% 16.97%
2007
5.27%
7.25%
5.02%
5.44%
8.20%
6.39%
9.05%
6.10%
2.08%
5.46%
5.00%
3.00%
5.00%
7.47%
4.14% 22.88%

Appendix 5: Derived Rates100
End of Year
CN Nom GDP (Tn)
GDP Growth
China CPI
China CPI2
Official 1-Yr Deposit
1/2 Spread
2002 Real Rate
GDP Proj.
2000
9.92
10.64%
0.26
0.26%
2.25%
4.05%
3.01%
6.77%
2001
10.97
10.52%
0.72
0.72%
2.25%
4.05%
3.47%
6.69%
2002
12.03
9.74%
-0.77
-0.77%
1.98%
3.65%
1.98%
6.11%
2003
13.58
12.87%
1.16
1.16%
1.98%
3.65%
3.90%
8.41%
2004
15.99
17.71%
3.88
3.88%
2.25%
3.92%
6.63%
11.94%
2005
18.49
15.67%
1.82
1.82%
2.25%
3.92%
4.57%
10.45%
2006
21.63
16.97%
1.46
1.46%
2.52%
4.32%
4.21%
11.40%
2007
26.58
22.88%
4.75
4.75%
4.14%
5.81%
7.50%
15.72%

Appendix 6: Derived Transfers
Year

Population

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

1/2 Spread

Avg:
Sum:

99

235.1
241.7
254.4
251.2
155.2
215.2
309.9
179.2
24.5
1,841.9

Per Capita
Annual
Income

1.263
1.272
1.280
1.288
1.296
1.304
1.311
1.318

1/2 Spread

Nominal
GDP

3,712
4,059
4,519
4,993
5,645
6,367
7,175
8,475

9,921.5
10,965.5
12,033.3
13,582.3
15,987.8
18,493.7
21,631.4
26,581.0

Transfer Per
Capita (RMB)

Transfers as
% of Per
Capita
Income

189.7
199.0
213.7
212.3
134.6
199.5
298.6
179.2

186.2
190.0
198.7
195.0
119.7
165.1
236.4
135.9

1,626.5

1,427.0

5.0%
4.7%
4.4%
3.9%
2.1%
2.6%
3.3%
1.6%
3.5%

GDP
Deflator

2.06%
2.05%
0.58%
2.61%
6.91%
3.93%
3.79%

1/2 Spread

2.4%
2.2%
2.1%
1.8%
1.0%
1.2%
1.4%
0.7%
1.6%
6.1%

Baseline
Deposits

6,433.2
7,376.2
8,691.1
10,361.8
11,955.5
14,105.1
16,158.7
17,253.4

2002 Real
Rate

98.7
163.6
0.0
290.0
408.3
299.6
290.8
361.1
49.4
1,912.2

Baseline
Loans

Net Baseline
Net Interest
Deposits
Income
(2007 RMB)

Net Bank
Deposits

450.0 5,983.2
700.0 6,676.2
1,050.0 7,641.1
1,450.0 8,911.8
2,000.0 9,955.5
2,100.0 12,005.1
2,300.0 13,858.7
3,200.0 14,053.4

2002 Real
Rate

Transfer Per
Capita (RMB)

79.7
134.7
0.0
245.1
354.0
277.8
280.2
361.1

78.2
128.7
0.0
225.1
315.0
229.8
221.8
274.0

1,732.6

1,472.6

4,826.3
5,496.4
6,419.8
7,531.1
8,632.9
11,129.8
13,353.2
17,253.4

Transfers as %
of Per Capita
Income

2.1%
3.2%
0.0%
4.5%
5.6%
3.6%
3.1%
3.2%
3.2%

Official 1-yr
Deposit

293.9
302.1
302.5
298.8
209.7
290.9
433.8
445.5

2002 Real
Rate

1.0%
1.5%
0.0%
2.1%
2.6%
1.6%
1.3%
1.4%
1.4%
6.5%

1/2 Spread

2.25%
2.25%
1.98%
1.98%
2.25%
2.25%
2.52%
4.14%

GDP Proj.

590.4
595.7
631.4
969.5
903.5
1,060.5
1,528.4
1,246.4
170.6
7,525.8

GDP Proj.

2002 Real
Rate

4.05%
4.05%
3.65%
3.65%
3.92%
3.92%
4.32%
5.81%

Transfer Per
Capita (RMB)

476.2
490.4
530.5
819.3
783.5
983.1
1,472.6
1,246.4

467.6
468.4
493.1
752.5
697.1
813.4
1,165.8
945.8

6,802.1

5,803.7

GDP Proj.

3.01%
3.47%
1.98%
3.90%
6.63%
4.57%
4.21%
7.50%
Transfers as %
of Per Capita
Income

12.6%
11.5%
10.9%
15.1%
12.3%
12.8%
16.2%
11.2%
12.8%

6.77%
6.69%
6.11%
8.41%
11.94%
10.45%
11.40%
15.72%

GDP Proj.

6.0%
5.4%
5.2%
7.1%
5.7%
5.7%
7.1%
4.7%
5.9%
25.6%

Bloomberg and WorldBank
China rates from PBC

100
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Appendix 7: Derived Net Savings
Per Capita
Annual
Income

Year

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

3,712
4,059
4,519
4,993
5,645
6,367
7,175
8,475

GDP
Deflator

Baseline
Deposits

-1.25%
2.06%
2.05%
0.58%
2.61%
6.91%
3.93%
3.79%

5,962.2
6,433.2
7,376.2
8,691.1
10,361.8
11,955.5
14,105.1
16,158.7
17,253.4

1/2 Margin
Eff. Rate +
Prem%

9.34%
9.09%
8.34%
7.20%
4.09%
5.08%
6.19%
4.51%

Baseline
Loans

Net Savings

300.0 5,662.2
450.0 5,983.2
700.0 6,676.2
1,050.0 7,641.1
1,450.0 8,911.8
2,000.0 9,955.5
2,100.0 12,005.1
2,300.0 13,858.7
3,200.0 14,053.4

Y/Y Increase

Net Interest
Income

321.1
693.0
964.8
1,270.7
1,043.8
2,049.6
1,853.6
194.7

New
Deposits

293.9
302.1
302.5
298.8
209.7
290.9
433.8
445.5

27.2
390.9
662.3
971.9
834.0
1,758.7
1,419.8
-250.8

2002 Real Rate
Projected
Interest
Income

529.0
565.1
598.4
607.2
410.1
572.3
841.8
714.4

Projected
Net
Deposits 1

5,662.2
6,218.4
7,174.4
8,435.1
10,014.2
11,258.4
13,589.4
15,851.0
16,314.7

Proj. Inc/
Capita
(RMB)

1/2 Spread

419.0 4,924.9
444.3 5,640.9
467.4 6,587.9
471.3 7,772.6
316.4 8,686.5
439.0 10,423.6
642.1 12,090.6
542.1 12,379.4
1,715.8

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol8/iss1/8

Eff. Rate +
Prem%

6.93%
7.78%
4.53%
7.71%
6.93%
5.93%
6.04%
5.82%

Pop. (Bn)

1.263
1.272
1.280
1.288
1.296
1.304
1.311
1.318

Effective
Interest
Rate

Int. Inc. Per
Capita
(RMB)

5.19%
5.05%
4.53%
3.91%
2.35%
2.92%
3.61%
3.21%

Baseline

232.8
237.5
236.3
231.9
161.8
223.1
330.9
338.0

4,738.7
5,249.2
5,967.7
6,916.9
7,681.3
9,208.3
10,571.0
10,663.6

GDP Proj.

Projected
Interest
Income

392.7
473.4
314.7
610.5
659.2
652.4
809.4
910.3

Projected
Net
Deposits 1

5,662.2
6,082.0
6,946.3
7,923.4
9,505.8
10,999.1
13,410.1
15,639.3
16,298.8

Proj. Inc/
Capita
(RMB)

2002 Real
Rate

311.0 4,816.9
372.2 5,461.6
245.8 6,188.2
473.9 7,378.0
508.6 8,486.5
500.4 10,286.1
617.4 11,929.1
690.7 12,367.4
1,703.8

Eff. Rate +
Prem%

15.62%
15.00%
13.99%
16.60%
12.49%
13.57%
16.34%
12.21%

Projected
Interest
Income

884.3
986.3
1,112.2
1,614.3
1,537.9
1,993.1
3,013.2
2,791.8

Projected
Net
Deposits 1

5,662.2
6,573.6
7,950.9
9,725.4
12,311.6
14,683.6
18,435.4
22,868.5
25,409.5

Proj. Inc/
Capita
(RMB)

700.4
775.5
868.6
1,252.9
1,186.6
1,528.8
2,298.4
2,118.4

GDP Proj.

5,206.2
6,251.4
7,595.6
9,555.8
11,329.3
14,140.6
17,443.3
19,280.5
8,616.9

40

